Wednesday, 25 July 2018

Revised


AESTHETICS – MARXISM’S ACHILLES HEEL?    

Or: some questions and problems in Marxist aesthetics


Beauty: […] a combination of qualities that delights the aesthetic sense.

Aesthetic […] concerned with beauty or the appreciation of beauty. Of pleasing appearance […]; denoting a literary and artistic movement in England during the 1880s, devoted to ‘art for art’s sake’ and rejecting the notion that art should have a social or moral purpose.

                                                          Concise Oxford English Dictionary




I

          Aesthetics, or the philosophy of beauty, is a curious branch of philosophy since these days it seems almost an anachronism. 

Branches of philosophy have doings with their parallel sciences; aesthetics, however ‘anachronistic’, is no exception. Thus it is brought into play in tracing the provenance of erstwhile valuable paintings on behalf of auction houses and galleries and in the creation of exhibitions, but it is not itself concerned with microscopic analysis of particles or substances in the paint that betray the century or even decade in which the work was produced. Art history and social background are much more relevant to strictly aesthetic judgment: indeed aesthetics would be helpless without these, but even they are secondary to the primary concern of aesthetics: What is Beauty? And how does art in all its manifestations – plastic, musical, literary, poetic and dramatic, dance – make beauty?

But how does a self-respecting Marxian dialectical materialist get to grips with ‘the Beautiful’? It seems awfully diaphanous and out of date. Nobody in the 21st century talks about ‘the beautiful’ any more. Is that because it is such an ugly century?

Beauty, loveliness. What on earth are they?

…But the loveliness we find in a lot of art…is another story. We don’t talk about it, or at best only talk contemptuously of it, but hardly any forms of painting don’t have it. It seems to be a property or a quality that can never be wholly got rid of. However much we may stop mentioning it and try to shame it into leaving, it just keeps on hanging around.

                           -   Matthew Collings, This Is Modern Art (1999) 106


And the reason it goes on ‘hanging around’ is – according to Collings – ‘because the human nervous system is tuned to seek out loveliness and beauty and to crave them’. (Ibid., 108) How useful is this comment? Does it foster a belief in a kind of spiritual ‘inner light’ that forms the basis also for religious doctrine and practice? In the hard, material world, there is no such ‘instinct’. The whole concept is Idealist.

          Except that it is not. Some kind of ‘instinct’ for beauty is grounded in nature, in evolution:

Sir David Attenborough has proposed there is evidence animals and birds have “an aesthetic sense” as he delivered the Charleston-EFG John Maynard Keynes Prize lecture. The Blue Planet star said: “Birds appreciate beauty, complexity or colour, just as much as we do.” (i newspaper, 22.5.18)


As he is a seasoned naturalist and broadcaster Sir David’s opinion must be respected. In his time he has shown us the bower-bird, who spends much of his waking life creating nests of flowers and all things beautiful to attract a mate. Or – in the bird of paradise – one who adorns himself in order to achieve the same result. These creatures are hard-wired by evolution to do just this; Sir David glides over the difference between what is unconsciously and what is consciously wrought: a distinction Marx makes clear when comparing bees with architects in Capital I. But the fact that the ‘beauty’ is unconsciously and instinctively created only strengthens the argument for the materiality of beauty: especially since it is usually successful in attracting the eye of the female or the species would have died out long ago. Indeed the idea is no more astounding than the fact that migratory birds navigate by the stars. In any case our knowledge of the consciousness of animals and birds is still in its relative infancy. It is not too much of a leap to suggest that humans, themselves evolved from the animal kingdom, might well be ‘tuned to seek out loveliness and beauty and to crave them’. This is traceable through studies of prehistoric times:

Art…enriched the spiritual culture of upper Palaeolithic societies. The           engravings  and paintings in the French caves are admired as beautiful by artists today. If they were executed for prosaically utilitarian magical purposes, that did not debar the artist from an aesthetic satisfaction in making his drawings beautiful, even though he could see it no more than Beethoven could hear the Ninth Symphony.  Music, as in graphic arts may have played a part in Magdalenian magic, since bone pipes and whistles have been found in the caves.

  • Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (1952) 42

In another passage from the same chapter, Prof. Childe (himself a Marxian socialist) writes:

Finally, many of the later tools, particularly of the hand-axe class, display extraordinary care and delicacy of workmanship. One feels that more trouble has been expended on their production than was needed just to make them work. Their authors were trying to make something not only useful, but also beautiful. If so, the tools in question are really works of art, expressions of aesthetic feeling.

  • Ibid.  32

And, incidentally, the cave paintings mentioned in the first quote go back some 30,000 years: quite recent in terms of the entire stretch of human existence as hunter-gatherers, but some twenty millennia before the coming of farming and animal husbandry. Art, however conceived and executed, is in our terms ancient indeed. It may have extended also to the Neanderthals, whose graves have revealed decorative aspects. The Materialist basis for beauty, from the natural-instinctive to the humanly-wrought, is established beyond doubt.


II


Istvan Meszaros (1930-2017) in his ground-breaking work Marx’s Theory of Alienation (4th edition 1979) deals extensively with Marx’s earlier writings, centring on human alienation (a term Marx used less as time went by but never abandoned as a fundamental concept) in its concrete forms: political, economic, ‘ontological and moral’ and aesthetic. Closing his aesthetics chapter, Meszaros sums up Marx’s view on art comprehensively:

Artistic creation, under suitable conditions, is considered by Marx as a free activity, as an adequate fulfilment of the rich human being. Only in relation to a natural being can the question of freedom be raised as fulfilment which is in harmony with this being’s inner determination, and only in this relation can freedom be defined in positive terms.

Art, in this sense, is an “end in itself” and not a means to an end external to it. But art, conceived in such terms, is not one of the specialities among the many, preserved for the fortunate few, but an essential dimension of human life in general. In the form in which we know it, art is deeply affected by alienation, because the “exclusive concentration of artistic talent in some” is inseparably bound up with “its suppression in the masses as a result of the division of labour…” (211)

So there’s no suggestion that art in future socialist society will be abolished; ‘But just as [Marx] insisted that alienated science must be transformed into a “human science”, so he insists that art too must lose its “alienated character.”’ (212)

          Meanwhile, what of art, music, poetry, fiction, etc. today? We can hardly down tools knowing that our aesthetic activities are ‘alienated’ and thus ineluctably compromised by our misfortune of continuing to live under a capitalism which, however morally desiccated and in throes of long-term decline, still rules the world. Many artists, those who are great, outstanding or fairly average, have been or are socialists and communists, including such as Picasso and Neruda, for example. Many or most came from nonprivileged backgrounds that failed in the end to hold them back. Much of art today invokes a language of protest. The upper-crust scene is dominated, of course, by money in search of art as a capital asset with obscene figures reached at the auction houses. But the world of art taken as a whole is too varied, socially and artistically, to be characterised in any very easy way. We could certainly put forward a case for saying that by virtue of the age it is in, all of it is ‘alienated’, and this may indeed form a starting-point for one incursion into Marxist aesthetics, but starting-point is all it could possibly be.

All in all, the recorded remarks by Marx and Engels are somewhat scrappy on art as such, but there may be sufficient here on which to build a Marxist—Materialist theory.  Marx’s German Idealist philosophical predecessor, GWF Hegel, has a great deal more to say about aesthetics, full of illumination for the budding aesthetician. In fact I will now intermingle the three following quotations as between Meszaros and Hegel (the latter in this case considering the relationship of art to religion).

Istvan Meszaros has important things to say that relate directly to the possibility of a Marxist aesthetics. But he also draws from a (rather thin) heritage that which is questionable. I have to take you through some philosophical excerpts to get to my point on the aesthetic implications. First, Meszaros:

If utilitarianism is a trivial and shallow philosophy, its artistic counterpart, “naturalism”, is a graphic embodiment of disconnected triviality and utter shallowness. This is so because nature depicted by naturalistic artists, often in the most tediously detailed “faithful” manner, is dehumanised nature.

  • Ibid., 195-96

Unexpectedly, we find some similarity in this ‘Materialist’ Marxist passage on art to passages in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind such as this one:

[T]hough art [as] the sole organ in which the abstract and radically-indistinct content – a mixture from natural and spiritual sources – can try to bring itself to consciousness […] its form is defective because its subject-matter and theme is so – for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being immanent in it. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity – for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull, and hence has not the power to transmute the external to significance and shape.

- GWF Hegel, Philosophy of Mind section 562, (1830) transl.    William Wallace, (Oxford edn. 1978) 296

Back to Meszaros:

There is but one sense in which “faithfulness” is relevant to art: it is a faithfulness in representing the reality of man [sic]…Man’s reality, however, is not given in a direct natural (phenomenal) immediacy, but only in an immensely complex dialectically structured, human totality. Consequently, there is a world of difference between the faithfulness of shallow naturalism and that of realism which aims at the comprehension of this dialectical totality of man. … Realism, with regard to its means, methods, formal and stylistic elements, is necessarily subject to change, because it reflects a constantly changing, and not a static, reality.

  • Op.cit., 195-96

I am holding on to Meszaros’ equation of the real with the total, of totality. But in the meantime he associates alienated ‘anti-naturalism’ with alienated modern art:

Thus the various “isms” (imagism, expressionism, Dadaism, analytic and synthetic cubism, futurism, surrealism, constructivism, etc.), just like the anti-naturalistic philosophical schools, do not make the situation one whit better. They fail to distinguish between humanised and dehumanised nature and thus reject nature altogether, only to be compelled in the end to readapt it in an equally dehumanised abstract form.

  • Ibid., 195-96

It is a tragic irony that all of the schools of art he mentions above, and more besides, were banned in both the Soviet Union under Stalin and in Nazi Germany as ‘degenerate art’, their artists denied exhibition (except the infamous mock ‘exhibitions’ of ‘degenerate art’ organised under the Nazis to show good Germans what ‘degenerates’ the artists were). Istvan Meszaros, who fled from the Soviet invasion of his native Hungary in 1956, was certainly no Stalinist, but in this last quotation he finds himself historically in bad company.

          Meszaros shows little knowledge or understanding of artists such as Malevich, Kandinsky, Mondrian, Klee, Pollock, Rothko and just about any other major artistic figure in the West and elsewhere in the 20th century.  His despised Dadaists were at war with a bourgeois Western art they considered culturally responsible for the carnage of a World War going on all around them in 1916. What works of ‘realism’ by the Dadaists would have sufficed at a time when the world appeared to have gone mad? Then there were the Expressionists like Grosz and Dix showing their hatred for the corruption of all values in the bourgeoisie of the Weimar period.



And how did Meszaros respond to ‘Guernica’ by Picasso (1937): the great semi-abstract black-and-white imagery of war, violence and death which brings tears to the eyes of spectators in its Spanish museum today? Not to speak of emotions invoked in viewers of Rothko’s ‘abstract’ massive glowing forms in their American gallery settings? Yet in Meszaros’ terminology, these amongst others must be viewed as ‘dehumanising’ artists. Is this not a classic case of the messengers being blamed for the message? And have they really made things ‘not one whit better’?

          But worse is to follow – in another book. Drawing upon a quote from Marx, that capital is ‘hostile to art and poetry’, Meszaros writes of hostile capitalism ‘rather than taking [art and poetry] to a higher degree of development in line with the productive achievements of the material base, frustrating thus the attempts of Voltaire and others to produce great epic poetry on the soil of a social formation that objectively oppresses such attempts, whoever might be the artist involved.’ (Social Structure and Forms of Consciousness II 2011, 148.)

          We might pass over Voltaire’s contemporary Alexander Pope who amongst his great ‘mock’ epics rather freely and brilliantly translated Homer’s Iliad, published to acclaim in that most capitalist of countries England and remaining a living work of our literature. And pass over others who were so ‘oppressed’ that they  failed to produce Goethe’s Faust, Byron’s Don Juan, Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin, plus Tennyson, Browning, Wordsworth, Longfellow and Whitman, all of whom wrote epics or epic-scale poems that continue to be read today.

          We might pass over all these because Meszaros, in writing of the literary scene from the 18th century onwards, somehow fails to mention the novel, a form that effectively dethroned epic poetry at the centrality of literature from thenceforward, commencing with Don Quixote and later Robinson Crusoe in 1719 and taking in Richardson, Smollett, Fielding, Sterne, Diderot, Laclos, Goethe, Scott, Austen and on to Stendhal,  the Brontes, etc. Mostly bourgeois to the core and still going strong. Yes, the epic poems were still being written and often successfully, but Meszaros’ whole line of argument is shown up for what it is in what seems the odd exclusion of the novel form from literature in the 17th and 18th centuries and onwards. ‘Oppression’ neither killed off the epic poem nor thrust the novel down a luckless public’s throat. If anyone commenced the process of killing-off heroic epic poems it was Miguel de Cervantes.

          These lapses in aesthetics are serious faults in a writer of unparalleled acuity and penetration in contemporary Marxism. It is the reverse of Ben Bernanke’s famous statement about Quantitative Easing: that it works in practice but not in theory. Meszaros’ remarks on aesthetics work in theory but not in practice, and unintentionally give theoretical Marxism a bad name.

          And if art has been so ‘alienated’ all these centuries, why do we have any great art and literature at all? Has anything beautiful ever come from a beautiful society? This is not to say that beauty will be not produced in its own way with socialism, hugely enhanced with the freeing of the capacities of the many to make beauty and to enjoy it and communicate it. The only thing wrong with the art of the past (and much of the present) is that it is or was denied the many whether deliberately or purely because of the ruling system’s demands (including demands on time and energy) on the souls of those it exploited in the past or continues to exploit. But in discussing the beauty of art as such, it is irrelevant (to us) as to whether it was produced under barbarism, slavery, serfdom or industrial exploitation. Except that much of its beauty is and was a direct beneficiary of class oppression and exploitation.

          I also think we have to be very careful in how we treat the subject of aesthetics as an ‘ideology’ in the sense of Marx’s 1859 Preface, listing it in the ideological superstructure alongside politics, economics, philosophy, religion and law. No doubt ‘aesthetics’ as embedded in bourgeois art and literary criticism is for the chop in any future socialist society, but ‘art’ itself is not in the same league as law, politics, economics, religion (or indeed contemporary social science) as an unequivocally coeval oppressor tied to the dominating material base. For one thing it is much older than any of these; it pre-dates them all, for a start, from long before there was or could be such a thing as a class-society necessitating an ideological superstructure formed through the evolution of a material base. ‘Ideology’ is to do with class conflict: it has no meaning outside it. Art in that sense existed before class conflict, whatever aesthetics made of it thereafter.



          Long before even the rudiments of science and philosophy, human social production and reproduction in a lengthy period of barbarism found a ‘shortcut’, as we might call it, to truth. That is, a grasp of a sort of the reality of the workings of the seen and the unseen world. This ‘direct route’ to knowledge and wisdom lay in magic, and in a ritual reinforced or ‘authorised’ by tribal mythology, while art (music, dance, decoration) was both a natural impulse and the instrumentality for the other three – magic, ritual and myth. It was these that negotiated with fear and with the spirits of game animals, put courage and patience into hunters and warriors and (apparently) cured ailments and brought babies: the essence of hunter-gatherer social production and reproduction. Although all these remain facets of aboriginal life today, art alone has grown well beyond its aboriginal origins as it has kept open the ‘direct route’ or ‘shortcut’ to understanding, power and mastery. Magic long ago reached a dead end, except as entertainment. But the practice of and engagement with art in all its forms continues to sustain us and in doing so is not illusory in terms of ‘results’. Art continues to manifest powerful effects on us. (I mention in passing a caricature of my argument in the stories brought up by the news from time to time of hens apparently laying better when Mozart is played to them, or cows being milked to Beethoven!)


II


It was GWF Hegel (1770-1831) in his Science of Logic (1812) who draws our attention to the fact that Being is not quite the ‘be-all-and-end-all’:

Being and nothing in their unity, which is determinate being, are no longer being and nothing – these they are only outside their unity – thus their unstable unity, in becoming, they are coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

          Science of Logic, transl. AV Miller (1998) 119

[…] positive and negative, cause and effect, however much they may be taken as isolated from each other, are at the same time meaningless one without the other. There is present in them their showing or reflection in each other, the showing or reflection in each of its other.

          Ibid., 122

The object or person you see before you is in a process of change from past to future even as you look at them. Everything contains elements or traces of what it was in the process of becoming and in process of becoming what it will be. Reality in the sense indicated by Meszaros, above, is not the present but the totality of past-present-future.  (Even ‘the present’ is open to doubt, since once one contemplates the present, it has become the past.) A rock has more ‘present’ than a waterfall, in a manner of speaking, but it is changing all the same, if at a slower rate than the waterfall. Our solid earth is in fact unstable with shifting continents, travelling at eighteen thousand miles per hour through space. Our moon is moving away from us and in a future time will no longer be in our sky. Our sun is commencing a lengthy process of dying, like other stars. An infant child is changing almost before our eyes so that we almost need to capture its little presence on camera before it’s too late. Transition and movement are all around us, so that ‘reality’ cannot be grasped as something in stasis. We are always in a state of transition, and this is indicative of the totality we both live in and make real. Hamlet is the archetypal man-in-transition. You can pin him down within moments and specific sayings and actions and reactions but you can't pin him down overall at all because he's on the move: we all are, whatever our type or personality. One of the reasons I admire the novels of Willa Cather (1883-1947) is that she depicts her characters dynamically as they go through life's changes down through the decades: she creates an intensely moving effect by doing this. If you determine to trace back to the origins of an action or event, you would literally have to go back to the origin of the universe and its material totality. Thus novels (for example) can be unbelievably complex, and even then can only indicate arbitrary limits to the inquiry at hand. 

          The social totality – that is, the human and humanised nature – is an outgrowth from the vastly huger material totality of all of nature and finally of the universe, perhaps ultimately a multiverse of which as yet we know nothing. The religious Idealist-abstract totality is a false one, but that doesn’t mean that there is no totality, for without totality and all the individuals and materials that together give it existence, there is nothing: no space, no time, no motion, which is logically and physically impossible. As Spinoza says, from nothing, nothing comes. The spiritually-minded will say that all was caused by God. But who or what caused God? So even the religious rely on cause and effect, but by an uncaused cause and an effect which is not possible without space, time and motion.

          What the artist conveys in all forms is the totality that is manifested by each object of artistic scrutiny (including sounds) as part of the greater whole. Thus there is in good and great art a sense in which we are seeing or hearing ‘more’ than meets the eye or ear from the visual or musical or verbal object before us. That object indeed, partakes in the totality, which is the true reality, just as we and everything around us are what make the totality exist.

The dialectical conception of totality seems to have put a great distance between itself and reality, it appears to construct reality very “unscientifically”. But it is the only method capable of understanding and reproducing reality.

  • Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (1923) transl. Rodney Livingstone (1971) 10

The radical, materialist rethinking of [Hegel’s] logic (dialectics) carried through by Marx, Engels and Lenin, was linked with affirmation of the objective reality of the universal, not at all in the spirit of Plato or Hegel [Idealism], but rather in the sense of a law-governed connexion of material phenomena, in the sense of the law of their being joined together in the composition of some whole, in the context of a self-developing totality or aggregate, all the components of which were related as a matter of fact not by virtue of their possessing one and the same identical attribute, but by virtue of a unity of genesis, by virtue of their having one and the same common ancestor, or to put it more exactly, by virtue of their arising as diverse modifications of one and the same substance of a quite material character (i.e. independent of thought and word).

EV Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic, transl. H. Campbell Creighton (2008) 334

In other words, the real is the total and the total is the real. There would be no totality without concrete existences: an ‘empty totality’ is no more than a phantom of abstraction. But the true reality of the concrete existence is inconceivable except as part of a, or of the wholeness. A playing-card – to function as such - requires both a suit and a deck; a suit is nothing and a deck is nothing without the cards making them up.

          All this is a very broad description of realism, but for art this means that the subject, character or musical theme is never without some implication or connection as being part of more than itself, is never real if lacking universal reference – in one way or another: perhaps this will become clearer as I continue.

‘Whenever we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.’ (Attributed to naturalist John Muir by JH Nichols, Natural History, November 1992.)

Meanwhile, in graphic art, what concrete forms has this taken in art history?

          In traditional painting various genres of subject emerged: religious iconography, landscapes, still-life, portraits, nudes, historical episodes, social settings. And in the meantime more directly symbolic, imagist, impressionist, pastiche, imitations of commercial art (Pop Art, for example), surrealism, fauvism, etc. etc. In our time things become more radical: severely abstract art, Performance Art (a work being ‘performed’ rather than being made or in which the action of the making is the art itself, as with drama to an extent), down to Minimalism and Conceptual Art. In the latter the ‘art’ resides in the concept rather than in anything manifested as an artefact: it might involve no artefact at all, but instead written-out messages on gallery walls suggesting what would be created if it could be. Art without being made or performed. A number of these manifestations are indicative of a perpetual struggle (going back at least to the ‘art for art’s sake’ movement in Britain in the 19th century) of artists to combat a seemingly inevitable commodification of their work – its social transformation of artwork into commercial product with a money value on the market. By striving to create an art that cannot be sold, artists may well feel that they have saved their effort from going through a commercialising degradation. One response is to create nothing at all. John Cage’s notorious work for piano of 1948, 4’33”, consists of not a single note: the pianist sits before the grand piano and plays nothing for this precise length of time. Not a work that lends itself, say, to reproduction on records or CDs!  (Spectators of this in performance soon realise that ‘silence’ during 4’33” is by no means the result. One might start with coughs, distant traffic-noise, ventilators - and find oneself before halfway through in a state of meditation!)

Our so-called ‘way-out’ art would not be realisable (which means pertinent) unless arising out of the society we live in, a society seeming itself vast, amorphous, impossible to comprehend or take in except in cerebral contemplation – a threatening society because of its power to overtake and swamp each of us. It is quite possible to put a Marxist construction on Conceptual art, Minimalist art and so on without condemning them even when condemning the society through which they are conceived: the wrong path down which Meszaros trod. But Istvan Meszaros’ fundamental approach overall is the right one.

Meszaros, drawing from Marx and from Lukacs, stresses the reality of humankind as exemplary subjects for characterising the realism of humankind, and this sums up the true value of what Meszaros says about aesthetic alienation.  

As both Meszaros and Lukacs knew well, and as I reiterate, the beauty of an artist’s depiction of humanity and nature lies in a grasp of the totality in the subject. A great novel or work of art is about the subject as exemplifying everything there is. Hence the appeal of transcendent religion as subject-matter over so many centuries, the symbolism allowing for meanings to be read into depictions of (say) Medieval gardens or saintly figures encompassing the religious totality much greater in implication than the pure realism of the physical subjects. As Mahler once told Sibelius: ‘The symphony must be like the world. It must be all-embracing.’ But one does not have to compose gigantic symphonies to make beauty in totalistic realism nor write huge novelistic sagas like Balzac’s Human Comedy. Totality need not be physically grasped or visualised solely through quantification. Here is William Blake:

To see a World in a grain of sand,

And a Heaven in a wild flower,

Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,

And Eternity in an hour.

  • Auguries of Innocence





Consider Albrecht Durer’s tuft of grasses watercolour of 1502: rendered with intricate and perceptive realism yet symbolic in the sense that this tuft alone has been singled out against a neutral background as the artist’s rendering of creation: the format itself provides the significance of the subject. If I were responsible for contributing to a time-capsule to be sent to other systems and galaxies, I might well choose this one Durer, as if to say: ‘This is our earth!’   Consider, say, the bare simplicities of a Raymond Carver short-story and try to escape its universal human relevance. With regard to subject-matter, Charles Fort says somewhere: ‘One may draw a circle, beginning anywhere.’


 Courbet’s Origin of the World, (above, 1872) shows what is the universal in the particular, as it is deliberately entitled. Van Gogh’s Chair (as instanced by Meszaros), a portrayal if not a portrait of Van Gogh himself


is about all of human life: its poverty, its loneliness, its comfort in humble things: look at it long enough and you will discover many more things besides.

          Totality in its material whole as such is impossible to depict, but resonances of it in the this, the here-and-now, are possible. Artists like Kandinsky and Mondrian turned to abstraction to convey the whole as directly as possible without an intervening representationalism. Malevich’s various Black Squares are meant to be indications of what the Black Square is suggesting: points of reference and direction to the infinite.





          The difference between a Sunday painter and an artist of course lies immediately in the latter’s greater skill. But while the Sunday painter considers that he or she is succeeding if he or she can render an adequate likeness of a flower or a tree, the greater painters give through the medium of their subjects a glimpse into the totality which forms the true ‘realism’ of their depiction. The art fulfils the totality the more an artist/composer/writer/dancer/actor etc. throws more of themselves into the work; the less good the art, amongst other things the less of the self has gone into it, for it is the self that is the conduit for a totalising apprehension and commission. Totality itself includes personal responses to it, for the self is as much a part of the totality as everything else around it. If everyone saw things the same way as each other, there would be no possibility of artistic creativity.

          Art is indispensable because human totality incorporates more than verbalised thought. It includes bursting into tears, feeling lust, stamping one’s foot in frustration, suffering indescribable fear or pain, suckling, smiling, winking – all that cannot be ‘said’ in so many words. Ask an artist to respond to, say, the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ and the response might well be to seize a paintbrush or sketching pencil, as a composer might start improvising on the piano or guitar. A poet knows that words are the enemy and so must warily pursue them like a squaddie crossing a section of minefield. (Words are the natural friends of politicians and salesmen.) When poets realise that words are not their friends they are on their way to becoming artists – in words. Lives can be saved by noxious poisons but only once you've identified them as poisons. And so it is also no wonder that novelists slave over their chapters. We read of Raymond Carver’s editor ruthlessly expunging words and phrases from the manuscripts – indeed as if words were the enemy – to produce the finely-honed stories as we know them. (Some readers of the ‘unexpurgated’ Carver might demur.)  Everything is significant by dint of what it is signifying.  It is the portrayal of the significance which brings beauty to the work, makes the work 'more' than what it seems.

          I want to offer some analysis of just two paintings, the first by the Impressionist Camille Pissaro; the second by a progenitor of Pop Art Andy Warhol.  Both provide instances of what, as a Marxist, I would call the concrete, material totality. And, in such a way, offer us both beauty as significance and significance as beauty…. 


Camille Pissaro: Portrait of Jeanne (1872)



Pissaro rarely painted portraits; he rarely obtained commissions for them. His portrait of Jeanne, his daughter, is of a little girl of seven, sitting slightly forward in an armchair, facing the artist directly. One would hope for a note of gaiety in an intimate study of such an enchanting child but here there is none. The upper half of her face with her large, expressive brown eyes is cast in the shadow of the brim of her wide yellow straw hat. The source of natural light, from the left, is out of view, leaving us with a dullish, lustreless light that casts a pall over the room with its beige wall behind her. Her long, flowing hair is also brown, her dress brownish; only her pink apron offers a lighter contrast but the pink is muted, also dull. In her lap is a bouquet of flowers which she holds loosely but without interest. Her posture is tense. One senses an apprehension, even a fear, perhaps? We will know from the caption material that Jeanne died two years after this portrait was painted, and we know from the date that it would have been unlikely that the medical science of her day could have saved her from whatever the cause was. Was it already suspected that she had not long to live? Pissaro at any rate seems to have had a premonition. Otherwise why paint one’s little girl seemingly struggling with some instinctive fear? Here is a tender, tactfully reticent painting of all of life: birth (her childhood reminds us that she was born not so long ago), her childish helplessness and apprehension in the present, the premonition of death in her expressiveness in shadow, in the overall brown-ness of the painting: black may be the colour of death, but brown is near enough. Hence the totality of a life past, present and future, captured in a moment (or a few hours) of it. The totality of existence in one subject. Quite simply, Pissaro has painted it all. There is nothing more to be said.


Andy Warhol: 200 Campbell’s Soup Cans (1962)




The subject is just what it says: an aggressively frontal view of rows of photographically pristine cans of Campbell’s Soup and nothing else. Except that it is not quite what it seems. Each can was painstakingly hand-painted by the artist, so that although they may look uniform they are not – not quite. It is as if there was an individuality here somewhere but it is overwhelmed by the monumental uniformity: like repressed individuals made insignificant in a vast factory or open-plan office. The positioning is indeed awesomely monumental, even threatening, just as redolent of capitalist production-power as the massive winged chimera in stone in the British Museum is of Assyrian power and crushing might. This wall of soup cans shows us that capital, if banal, is both impersonal and invincible. Or is it? It might take only a child to knock them all down.


          Of the forms of ideological superstructure enumerated by Marx in the 1859 Preface, the content of aesthetics is the one that will not only be retained under socialism, but enhanced by wider practice, wider aesthetic teaching of a human-only sense for art. All the others – the legal, religious,  political, economic – will be transformed and perhaps turned inside out with the ending of class-conflict and classes themselves. The nature of aesthetics will certainly change with the popular practice of the arts but –like science – and for reasons already given here – art will go on being indispensable. There is hope for it even today:

Modern art generally is not that unpopular any more because it is    more connected to ordinary life now. And even its most radically blank manifestations are probably not all that unpopular either.

-         Collings Op cit., 144

Art after all had a share in inventing the idea of socialism, and it wants to have a share of its own now in moulding socialist society.

-         VG Kiernan, Socialist Register 1965, 234
    
‘Beauty is truth and truth beauty’ – that is all
Ye know, and all ye need to know.

-         John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn 







Wednesday, 13 June 2018


Coming soon: Aesthetics: Marxism’s Achilles Heel?

See below this post: History and Drama


Interim Report


          Apologies for not keeping up the blog recently. A combination of (minor) health issues, the Royal Wedding at Windsor, and a major piece that I will be blogging shortly which turned out to take rather longer to write than I thought it would. But the hand is back on the tiller, as it were.

          Meanwhile, what’s been happening here and there recently as we cull the news?…. But first, an observation. It seems that whenever a TV soap is losing out in audience figures to its rivals, it creates a major Who Shot JR? episode – i.e. one catastrophe or another – that has audiences glued and draws viewers away from other soaps. This is now what is happening with the Tories in our present politics. We all thought Mrs May was doomed and through results of a combination of her lamentable errors would soon be out. And the people would recognise this shambles of a government for what it is, what with ministers openly slating each other and even the PM. 



Then – a last-minute reprieve! (Of one sort or another.) The PM is saved, at least till next week! This is soap-opera at its most viewable, and the trouble is that it is driving Labour and Jeremy Corbyn off the main pages and bulletins. If the Tories can keep up the torrid in-fighting we may see them pulling off yet another victory (however slim) from the jaws of death. That is if they can prolong the agony until such time as Press and people have forgotten who Jeremy Corbyn is.  Through no fault of his own.  Labour is desperate to be a party of unity but in fact is riven by very deep class fissures: that is, between a working-class and a middle-class element that in other times would have been Liberal. The Tories are a party currently of disunity and dwindling membership but at least all Tories think roughly the same: different enough to put on a little show now and then, but in class terms strikingly regimented when it comes to corporate neoliberalism in general. Of course bits of biscuit can be thrown to the ducks from time to time especially just before a general election, to allow a squeak in – and failing that, the constituencies can be scaled down in numbers to suit the Tories anyhow.





          The Skripal poisonings. In the i the canny Mary Dejevsky went over Yulia Skripal’s public statement and found that it raised more questions than it answered. Why didn’t Yulia blame Russia? In fact she says she hopes she’ll be able to return to her homeland in the future. There was no naming of the nerve agent that allegedly poisoned her. Was it a substance or a spray?  Where, exactly, did it take place? Why – beyond ‘Russia’ – have we had no suspects named whatsoever, even now? We have been advanced no motive for the crimes. Well, whatever: the alleged incident encouraged the British government to rally virtually the whole of the Western world to the anti-Russian cause. But now Donald Trump wants Russia to rejoin what used to be called the G8. So either the poisonings don’t matter or at least one of our leaders doesn’t really believe the story.



          Then we have the unveiling of the US’s F35B Lightning II, the most expensive aircraft of its kind and the most technically advanced of a new breed of ‘stealth’ fighters: that is, those that elude radar. The UK has ordered 48 of these jets from America at a cost of £9.1 billion, with the purchase of 90 more in the offing. Unfortunately, the craft are reported by a US  congressional committee not to have anything like the range needed to carry out long-distance missions. So they will need to be re-fuelled in mid-air by craft that cannot elude radar. Countless further billions will be required to develop a fleet of ‘stealth’ re-fuelling craft as well. Thank God Britain is in the black and looking forward to a strong overseas trading economy after leaving the EU,  and meanwhile we should be able to attack France.

          Finally, on 4th June (Daily Telegraph Business), the IMF said that it had uncovered something like $12 trillion in so-called ‘phantom investments…investments in empty corporations almost always passing through well-known tax havens’. In other words, the money has been discovered, but nobody knows what’s happened to it: i.e. in the form of investing in anything. The IMF suggests finding ‘a better means of keeping track of the flow of funds’…






          I find it necessary to make my introduction briefly autobiographical:  having had an interest in both history (as a school subject) and theatre since boyhood, I opted for drama or ‘show business’; over a lot of years, I worked in it as a writer and script editor, producer and director. I made a mid-life ‘sideways move’ when I went over to an academic career in contemporary history, serving for yet more years as an historian and university teacher. I ended up having known both professions fairly well. (I wasn’t totally unique: one of the other staff history lecturers had had a previous working life for many years as a professional actor. Perhaps not surprisingly his lectures could be electrifying.)
          I could not escape my drama background when becoming a historian if I tried. I am the same person who worked in drama who was also deeply attracted to the study of history. Drama has its theoretical side - called dramaturgy - and I was always interested in that, but my work was necessarily orientated to the severely practical: writing, editing, directing and producing.  And, in the process, delivering audiences – or not, as the case might have been.
          This may not strike the reader as a very rigorous background, intellectually speaking. But there is a certain rigour lying in a drama practice whose results are often experienced in starkly contrasting terms of success or failure, or hovering uncertainly in between, which can be more frustrating than outright failure and is indubitably more frequent than either.  Complete disaster (if not frustration) resulting from one’s work and research is probably less frequent in the academic world of the historian than it is an everyday occurrence and risk in drama. Every public, for any medium, has to be won over each time and then engaged with the goings-on. Obtaining this result is a recognised and respected skill amongst dramatic practitioners, be they directors, producers, actors, writers and so on, though many may not grasp (or even wish to grasp, if too much “theory” is perceived as inhibiting creativity) the underlying structural fundamentals of achieving it. Knowing and doing can be two different things, but there is a knowing that is potentially possible, which is what dramaturgy is concerned with.  One area where the two endeavours are remarkably similar (while we are discussing success and failure) lies in the business of obtaining grant funding. As in historical research, much professional / community drama relies on funding bodies and has to make similar applications on similar types of form. Successful attracting of finance seems to come from a person remarkably similar in both fields: the one adept at convincing bodies to part with their money through a detailed and properly-worded steerage of proposals and estimates via bureaucratic committee-set forms and formulae.  This is a specialist ability whose outcome in the actual work may or may not come to obtain only the most tenuous claim to posterity’s attention.  I have known professional playwrights whose talent for gaining bursaries from official bodies was in almost inverse proportion to their creative ability, for above all they had mastered the committees, the forms and the estimates. The resulting play, which might be commissioned by a particular theatre for a guaranteed short run of, say, three weeks, did not have to meet with any marked success from the public, or achieve full houses, since the length of its run did not rely on daily box-office receipts. Credits for such productions (some quickly forgotten, if they ever registered, with the theatregoing public) soon build up a systematic dramatist’s portfolio, facilitating future grant funding and so on ad infinitum. Likewise, there may be historians whose ability to achieve funding for research projects will not necessarily be indicative of an outcome in a study of significance to the longer-term contribution to knowledge.  Ideally the two types of ability ought to go together (and I suggest they are more likely to do so within the historical discipline), but at the same time I hazard that this could breed a mentality in both areas which comes to identify ‘success’ primarily in terms of raising money, for which we might apply the adage: the goal is nothing; the journey is all.   
          The orientation of drama production towards the notion of success is what led me to a view of science as a human praxis whose purpose is never neutral but orientated also to human success, whatever the necessary objectivity of its instrumentalities. Both science and drama are aimed to reveal their respective insights into “the truth”, and for both “the truth” of the object in question is manifested in the success of the enterprise: for the scientist in the successful uncovering, measuring, predicting and/or harnessing and manipulation of scientific objects by dint of the object’s apparent response to what turn out to be correct scientific hypotheses and procedures; for the drama practitioner “the truth” purveyed in the dramatic exercise is “proven”, whatever the private misgivings of some professionals (and rivals), by the successful courting of an audience with the result of audience involvement and enthusiasm, perhaps with the play in question becoming established more or less permanently in the repertoire - or, in the media, being repeated and aired all around the world.  
          Drama is centred on human beings whether they are personified as humans or as animals, spirits or objects (as in much children’s theatre and in movie cartoons and computer-generated features).  Drama is always about the human condition. A disaster movie featuring avalanches is not about avalanches as such but ultimately about their impact upon human beings: the fears they invoke in people, the changes they wreak on a community and on the personalities and relationships of surviving individual human beings. The avalanche may be the “shock and awe” aspect of the spectacle of the movie (and spectacle is important in certain movie genres), but if that were all there were to it, the film would be pretty empty – as the failure of a string of Hollywood epics too reliant on the potency of special effects and not relying enough on human interest may show.  The theme of such a movie, however simple it may be, will evoke human awe for natural disasters, human vulnerability when up against the forces of nature, and the humility – and perhaps more generous humanity – that mighty natural elements on the rampage must induce.  Any drama or comedy for the stage is not about the objects on the stage (or apparently off-stage) but about the human beings wandering amongst those objects, whatever the nature of their interaction. Drama is necessarily “human centred”.
          Drama is focused, more specifically, on human motivation. To discover what a character is, find out what he or she wants – and wants more than anything else in the world, whether in the negative sense of escaping or avoiding something or in the positive sense of obtaining something, be it material, spiritual or whatever.  The plot is the worked-out story of the pursuance of (usually conflicting) human needs, whether in comical or in serious or melodramatic terms. The most serious – and commonest - flaw in the creation of a dramatic character is for the author to have supplied too weak a motivation, one that leaves the character insufficiently driven. It is the driven-ness that makes the drama and creates the story.
          There is also the specificity of dramatic situations, the unrepeatable uniqueness. Every story is about this character and group of characters, not about some other. Too generalised a concept of human life, one that is too abstracted from the specifics of particular lives and living, will seem only arid and perhaps over philosophical or didactic – or, on the other hand, too routine - to an audience. Even the medieval mystery and miracle plays on the grand themes of human destiny in biblical terms – the plays that form the beginnings of modern drama after the classical – are wonderfully endowed with small character touches of individual foible and personality, right up to God himself.
          The mention of those plays brings in another aspect: one might call it the dialectical opposite to the uniqueness, which is universality. A boy-meets-girl story is given its appeal through the freshness, realism and vigour with which the particular young persons are endowed, both in the writing and in the acting. But the temptation to see them as too individual or peculiar, that is as having a story so unique as to lack all relevance to members of the audience in their own lives (often encountered by the script reader as self-indulgently obscure longeurs on the part of the writer), has to be counteracted. Highly individual and unique elements are interpenetrated with situations, images and emotions that are universal: love as the universal condition of human beings, with which we might all identify in varying degrees of empathy. Fortunately there is no limitation of scope on this account. Good drama has to avoid the pitfall of stereotyping or over-generalising character and exploiting too-routine situations on the one side and – on the other – the pitfall of situating the story too far away from recognisable concerns that the audience might otherwise be able to read into it.  Drama exemplifies the truth that universal situations and problems are always encountered through the medium of specific events, people and environments: the first is inseparable from the second. 
          With this goes a tension that I suggest operates both in dramatic and in historical practice: the tension between ‘realism’ and reality. This can manifest itself, for example, in the work of that dramatist who has gone for the portrayal of ‘ordinary, everyday folk’ which yet seeks to cast them into – say – tragic adversity. But experienced tragedy has a propensity for bringing out highly unusual qualities, whether in life or in drama, and in the process revealing a reality lying beneath ‘realism’. One might refer to this as an opposition of the ‘typical’ and the ‘real’.  In drama, some kind of play development is required to turn ‘typical’ characters into real characters. In drama, life may be ‘typical’ until a series of events or cataclysms draws the reality out from under it. But if the dramatist in question has set his or her mind to the depiction of ‘typical’ people, come what may, are these characters capable of carrying the tragedy, of standing out from the crowd because a kind of fate has marked them to do this?  If not, then the tragic effect is not realised. If, in history, we substitute social, statistical, demographic trends and figures (and one sort of theory or model or another arising from these) for ‘realism’ and actual recorded events for ‘reality’, we might see how such a tension could arise in historical practice – experienced as a conflict between ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ evidence.  More than one historian has pointed to the pitfalls lying in the availability of ‘too much’ statistical evidence rather than its paucity or unavailability, for its abundance can make the business of historical narrative and interpretation tortuous.
          Drama requires human agency: characters in plays must be progenitors of their own destinies, given the circumstances in which they are landed. Dramatic characters in a good play can never be passive lay figures: each one contributes, positively or negatively, and not always deliberately, to the outcome. Because of this central feature of dramatic practice it is difficult for me to avoid a bias of my own towards history as the “history of men, real men” and women in the formulation of Marx and Engels; self-willed persons operating within inherited conditions and conventions. These motivated persons, individually and collectively, have laid schemes and plans and designs and formed movements that came to fruition, or came to grief, or were variously modified in various outcomes. Not to speak of occasionally practicing deception, whether on themselves, on each other or perhaps on posterity. Thus I found it impossible to embrace any concept of historical determinism that stresses the ineluctability of destiny or the passivity of human actors, whether individually or in the mass, though this does not rule out the grip of what they have inherited, the legacy or “dead weight” of their past, which is a challenge to any new departure or to dealing realistically with new obstacles and problems.  If anything it is my non-academic drama background that immunises me from the appeal and blandishments of, say, the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser, which denies the centrality of the human subject in history in favour of the centrality of “structures”.  But Althusser is only one of the more thoroughgoing of theorists in this respect; his programme has been carried further along in a wholesale “denial of the subject” which forms the intellectual agenda of postmodernism. Postmodernist critical theory has certainly become the orthodoxy of film studies in particular and cultural studies in general, but my own reading of drama, and my lengthy practical experience in it (though I must not succumb to the hubristic temptation of making too much of the latter) denies me very much in the way of pleasure from the reading of effusions of that body of theory.  
          History is eventful and unrepeatable; its human actors may bear comparison with one another as being from within one era and another but they are not successive clones. History is conflictual or else there would be no events to depict and interpret. Its natural medium is time passing. In all this there are more than slight or whimsical resemblances between history and drama.
          Drama’s instrumentality lies in its play upon human emotions. Without emotionally committed responses to it a play will be a dead thing. How can this possibly relate to a dispassionate and objective study of history?
          It is easy enough for tear-jerking melodrama to induce sentimental emotion – that is, emotion for the sake of emotion. A movie of this kind, typically catering for a perceived women’s audience more susceptible than the male to “feelings”, used to be called a “weepy”.  Legitimate drama does not quite work in this way, but through the instrumentality of shifting subjectivities. Like history, its natural medium is time passing, and our the audience’s apprehension of and empathy with subjectivity in individual characters shifts through time and the unfolding of the drama. We go for this protagonist, but in the course of dramatic time we go for that protagonist as the one with whom we empathise or sympathise; we spectators are for this one and then we are for that one, to the point where we find ourselves on both or all sides of the conflict. An additional complication in the shift of our sympathies is that individual characters themselves appear to alter either through dramatic pressure upon them or through successive revelations about them. Out of this we achieve an emotional synthesis through a process of successive engagements, with this and then that character, or with one character going through transformation before our eyes. The problem with melodrama is that it accords all “good” to one side and all “bad” to the other, and in this sense melodrama is debased drama, imposing a morality or pre-conceived moral parameters. It does not, as in legitimate drama, depart from within itself. Drama – perhaps much like the pagan mythology from which it derives - transcends “good and bad”, which is why a great drama, whilst appealing also to unashamedly emotional and even sensationalising tendencies, will have a fundamentally different effect from the melodrama because through its structuring it forces its audience to feel for each side – or for each side of a single character - similarly if not always simultaneously. One’s view of Hamlet, for example, or Macbeth or Othello, cannot but develop into a certain complexity; the resulting conflict in ourselves as audience leads us to what might be termed – after Aristotle – a purgation.  Drama taught me as a historian that one will engage in committed fashion with each historical actor and/or collective manifestation in turn; the result of which is a complex process of engagement, disengagement and re-engagement which differs from a superficial and spurious assumption of impartiality from the outset (and, in drama, a superficial automatic reflex of sympathy-empathy also from the outset).  This “shifting subjectivity” in historical study is reflected by the various about-turns experienced in the course of primary research. It is unlikely that any historical researcher is not emotionally engaged with his or her material in the course of research, and it is unlikely that one who studies, for example, Napoleon for ten or twenty years will feel the same about him emotionally at the end of that time as at the beginning, given the accumulation of knowledge and insight. Theatre audiences, too, are put through the experience of testing and deepening their responses against seemingly conflicting “facts” and arguments. And this could also go on for ten or twenty years, if for example one sees the same play of Shakespeare’s several times over that period and perhaps comes to different conclusions each time (influenced, no doubt, by different productions, themselves evolving through our collective and long-time experience with the same play). I have responded to that classic Ealing comedy The Man in the White Suit many different ways through my many times of having seen it. When I first saw it as a child, I thought it was funny. In my more romantic adolescence I saw its story as that of the supreme individual pitting himself against (parental?) insensitive authority. Later on I saw it as the forces of capitalism crushing the spirit of human freedom. In time – as a professional myself if in a less exalted way - I came to admire its purely professional accomplishment – its direction, angles of shooting, cutting and so forth. Over time, however, my feelings and responses to it have become – I believe, anyhow – more complex than any one of the above manifestations though in a sense my current reaction incorporates all of them. Perhaps a definition of a great picture is that of its being able to evoke responses on so many levels, sometimes simultaneously in one viewer.
A “whodunit” poses an interesting instance of delayed melodrama and moral judgment in all this: we have to suspend our judgment on who is “good” and who is “bad” (i.e. the killer) finding to ourselves that most or all of the characters seem to all be pretty bad or all quite good or at least harmless, some maybe better than others. Then, when the killer is unmasked, we revel in his or her sheer, unadulterated badness, and so the melodramatic is restored to the whole offering, which up till then in certain whodunits may have been more forensic than dramatic.
 Historians are rightly suspicious of any history depicted more or less simplistically in terms of “good guys” and “bad guys”, but the sense of detachment derived from successive engagements with first this and then that historical protagonist (individual and/or collective) is resolved in a synthetic commitment which is more than purely intellectual, just as the synthetic commitment outcome in the audience for legitimate drama is more than purely emotional. In cases both of history and of drama because a process of apprehension has had to be gone through which has, in the course of this, picked up all sorts of complications that make undiluted intellect on the one hand or undiluted emotion on the other impossible responses.
          There are certain similarities in dramatic and historical problematics. One of these is to do with periodisation. What are the compelling reasons for setting such-and-such a topic between the years 1820 and 1890 as opposed to setting it between, say, 1780 and 1870? Periodising a study poses one of its greatest challenges, since history left to its own devices stretches back eons and otherwise simply goes on and on. The emerging periodisation of a study has to do with what one comes to want to say about the topic, one’s particular interpretation in the light of considered evidence. In drama, this problematic for the playwright can be termed point of attack and resolution – the one commencing the play and the other finishing it. When, in the assumed sequence of events, does the action of the play itself begin, and where along the way might one effect a significantly culminating ending? Again, as with the historian, this depends on what the theme of the play is, what the author is trying to say through it, what statement about the action taken as a whole is to be made. Historians who have a more or less contingent or non-thematic view of the histories they are undertaking are likely to find periodisation particularly arbitrary. They are somewhat like the substandard dramatist who, being weak on the interpretation of the dramatic events he or she is trying to depict, will find both a convincing point of attack and a resolution hard to come by.
          Related to that problematic is the one of narrative versus structure, diachronicity versus synchronicity. Plays depict not only courses of events but also the structure of situations which forms a more or less static or stable foundation and constant background for those events. The stage is both a setting for dynamic action and a static tableau. Scenic construction requires a multi-layered approach: stage traffic (entrances and exits) and stage business and action have to be integrated with the dialogue in a form of elaborated structure. In a comedy, for example, aural wit is blended with appropriate scenic design and lighting and scenic action, perhaps slapstick. Drama is deep structure as well as storytelling in the medium of dramatic time: establishing the relationship between the two is a major problematic. Similarly, and without prejudice so far as my views on Althusser remain, the historian is faced with the tension between narrative unfolding in a time sequence and devotion to a structural analysis of situations which are “outside of time” when considered as such. A history with no structural analysis would be children’s storybook history; on the other hand, a history without chronological drive and direction would more closely resemble sociology with a period setting.
          Another problematic, already alluded to, lies as between specificity and universalisation. Every play must focus on specific individuals in specific settings, yet a play which does not provide something of more universal relevance and significance, through a theme, would be of little interest to those in the audience who had not themselves come up against or experienced the specificities. When we speak of an in-joke we refer to something shared amongst members of an exclusive set which cannot be shared by outsiders; the dramatist will have to take that group’s experience and impart to it a comedy in which anyone can share, which means introducing some or other element of universality elevating the in-joke to something of wider implication. This problematic may be less clear to the historian, who in any case is usually dealing in highly specific history. Still, that history has to be contextualised from time to time, and historians will recognise a distinction to be made between the historian and the antiquarian. The antiquarian might be said to delight in amassing arcane facts for their own sake, like a hobbyist collector, rather than concerned to draw wider-embracing thematic conclusions.
          Where historical and dramatic practice may be said to contrast is in their respective appeals to contrasting forms of truth-telling. Broadly speaking, the historian appeals to the correspondence theory of truth, whereas the dramatist subscribes to the coherence theory of truth. A history is validated by its correspondence to the real world whereas a drama is validated by its internal cohesion which lends strength to its plausibility. History need not be plausible; indeed, historians are rightly suspicious of any historical construction of events which is so plausible as to seem more convincing than the evidence (and evidence is often very awkward) may warrant. Drama need not refer to any real event in the outside world in order to seem to impart a significant truth about human life. Yet there is an interesting degree of overlap. If the historian cannot come up with a coherent interpretation his or her treatment may well be superseded by one that can, and even the emphasis in the original research may be called into question. If the dramatist evinces no understanding of human behaviour in the real world – and, indeed, carries out no research whatever on the subject matter – the play will fail to correspond to human experience and might stand accused of failing to depict accurately or realistically the environment or characters it depicts.
          I will not in this paper venture forth into dialectical propositions as affecting both history and drama, with one exception: something to do with syntheses of preceding conflictual elements, or negation of the negation. In drama, the form of the play is a process of conflict between forces leading to an outcome that transcends both. The most time-honoured ending of a comedy is marriage, that is, reflecting an instinctive recognition that marriage is a qualitatively different state and a synthesis out of whatever relations existed before. Outcomes of developments incorporate what they have superseded. I will offer only one example from history but the reader is invited to find others: Louis XVIII of France did not simply succeed to the Bourbon throne in 1815 as if nothing had happened meanwhile. He attempted to reconcile previous conflicts, under Revolutionary and Bonapartist regimes – with his dynastic restoration. Historical developments do not simply succeed each other, they supersede each other. There is a temptation to embed a “law of progress” in all this, but “progress” as commonly understood may be far from what is going on here and there. Hitler superseded all middle-European movements of anti-Semitism and xenophobia and brought on a qualitative change – Nazism – that descended into a barbarism we are still attempting to reconcile with a concept of what it is to be “modern”.
          Perhaps it remains for all this to be developed in rather more detail; for the present a paradigm of drama is put forward as being just as suitable a means of approaching history as any other that I have read and considered. The intention here is not to suggest that all this intimates an elision of historical study into fictional drama – that is, to reduce or collapse history into a form of fictional literature and entertainment. Indeed, we must make these various comparisons in the process of making our distinctions. It is merely to suggest that an art such as drama has something to offer towards a comprehension of historical projects, and that this is a useful corrective against those views advanced which advocate a strictly dichotomous science/non-science approach to historical study; that is, to say that history should be modelled necessarily upon a scientific paradigm such as might suit a social or physical science. And – by the same token – saying that if history does not reach this requirement satisfactorily, then – ineluctably – it must be a kind of fiction, presented as an array of fictional tropes and genres. Yet if one conceives of history in the broader sense of Wissenschaft or learned study, then this consideration of a parallel artistic paradigm spoken of in the same breath with history should present no problems.  Perhaps those with some experience in the actual fiction industry are in a useful position to be able to distinguish between fiction and interpretation, while some of those who have spent their lives wrestling solely with the conundrum of fact may be more vulnerable to the abstracting blandishments of a ‘critical theory’ that collapses fact into fiction.